Mr. Chief Justice Roger Taney delivered the majority opinion.
This case has been twice argued. After the argument at the last term, differences of opinion were
found to exist among the members of the court; and as the questions in controversy are of the
highest importance, and the court was at that time much pressed by the ordinary business of the
term, it was deemed advisable to continue the case, and direct a re-argument on some of the
points, in order that we might have an opportunity of giving to the whole subject a more
deliberate consideration. It has accordingly been again argued by counsel, and considered by the
court; and I now proceed to deliver its opinion.
There are two leading questions presented by the record:
1. Had the Circuit Court of the United States jurisdiction to hear and determine the case between
these parties? And,
2. If it had jurisdiction, is the judgment it has given erroneous or not?...
If, however, the fact of citizenship is averred in the declaration, and the defendant does not deny
it, and put it in issue by plea in abatement, he cannot offer evidence at the trial to disprove it, and
consequently cannot avail himself of the objection in the appellate court, unless the defect should
be apparent in some other part of the record. For if there is no plea in abatement, and the want of
jurisdiction does not appear in any other part of the transcript brought up by the writ of error, the
undisputed averment of citizenship in the declaration must be taken in this court to be true. In this
case, the citizenship is averred, but it is denied by the defendant in the manner required by the
rules of pleading, and the fact upon which the denial is based is admitted by the demurrer. And if
the plea and demurrer, and judgment of the court below upon it, are before us upon this record,
the question to be decided is, whether the facts stated in the plea are sufficient to show that the
plaintiff is not entitled to sue as a citizen in a court of the United States.
This is certainly a very serious question, and one that now for the first time has been brought for
decision before this court. But it is brought here by those who have a right to bring it, and it is our
duty to meet it and decide it.
The question is simply this: can a negro, whose ancestors were imported into this country and
sold as slaves, become a member of the political community formed and brought into existence by
the Constitution of the United States, and as such become entitled to all the rights, and privileges,
and immunities, guarantied by that instrument to the citizen? One of these rights is the privilege of
suing in a court of the United States in the cases specified in the Constitution.
It will be observed, that the plea applies to that class of persons only whose ancestors were
negroes of the African race, and imported into this country, and sold and held as slaves. The only
matter in issue before the court, therefore, is, whether the descendants of such slaves, when they
shall be emancipated, or who are born of parents who had become free before their birth, are
citizens of a state, in the sense in which the word "citizen" is used in the Constitution of the
United States? And this being the only matter in dispute on the pleadings, the court must be
understood as speaking in this opinion of that class only; that is, of those persons who are the
descendants of Africans who were imported into this country and sold as slaves.
The situation of this population was altogether unlike that of the Indian race. The latter, it is true,
formed no part of the colonial communities, and never amalgamated with them in social
connections or in government. But although they were uncivilized, they were yet a free and
independent people, associated together in nations or tribes, and governed by their own laws.
Many of these political communities were situated in territories to which the white race claimed
the ultimate right of dominion. But that claim was acknowledged to be subject to the right of the
Indians to occupy it as long as they thought proper, and neither the English nor Colonial
Governments claimed or exercised any dominion over the tribe or nation by whom it was
occupied, nor claimed the right to the possession of the territory, until the tribe or nation
consented to cede it. These Indian governments were regarded and treated as foreign
governments, as much so as if an ocean had separated the red man from the white; and their
freedom has constantly been acknowledged, from the time of the first emigration to the English
Colonies to the present day, by the different governments which succeeded each other. Treaties
have been negotiated with them, and their alliance sought for in war, and the people who compose
these Indian political communities have always been treated as foreigners not living under our
own government. It is true that the course of events has brought the Indian tribes within the limits
of the United States under subjection to the white race; and it has been found necessary, for their
sake as well as our own, to regard them as in a state of pupilage, and to legislate to a certain
extent over them and the territory they occupy. But they may, without doubt, like the subjects of
any other foreign government, be naturalized by the authority of Congress; and become citizens of
a State and of the United States; and if an individual should leave his nation or tribe, and take up
his abode among the white population, he would be entitled to all the rights and privileges which
would belong to an emigrant from any other foreign people.
We proceed to examine the case as presented by the pleadings...
The question then arises, whether the provisions of the Constitution, in relation to the personal
rights and privileges to which the citizen of a state should be entitled, embraced the negro African
race, at that time in this country, or who might afterwards be imported, who had then or should
afterwards be made free in any State; and to put it in the power of a single State to make him a
citizen of the United States, and endue him with the full rights of citizenship in every other State
without their consent? Does the Constitution of the United States act upon him whenever he shall
be made free under the laws of a State, and raised there to the rank of a citizen, and immediately
clothe him with all the privileges of a citizen in every other State, and in its own courts?
The court think the affirmative of these propositions cannot be maintained. And if it cannot, the
plaintiff in error could not be a citizen of the State of Missouri, within the meaning of the
Constitution of the United States, and, consequently, was not entitled to sue in its courts...
It is difficult at this day to realize the state of public opinion in relation to that unfortunate race,
which prevailed in the civilized and enlightened portions of the world at the time of the
Declaration of Independence, and when the Constitution of the United States was framed and
adopted. But the public history of every European nation displays it, in a manner too plain to be
mistaken.
They had for more than a century before been regarded as beings of an inferior order; and
altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either in social or political relations; and so far
inferior, that they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect; and that the negro
might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit. He was bought and sold, and
treated as an ordinary article of merchandise and traffic, whenever a profit could be made by it.
This opinion was at that time fixed and universal in the civilized portion of the white race. It was
regarded as an axiom in morals as well as in politics, which no one thought of disputing, or
supposed to be open to dispute; and men in every grade and position in society daily and
habitually acted upon it in their private pursuits, as well as in matters of public concern, without
doubting for a moment the correctness of this opinion...
The language of the Declaration of Independence is equally conclusive.
It begins by declaring that, "when in the course of human events it becomes necessary for one
people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another and to assume
among the powers of the earth the separate and equal station to which the laws of nature and
nature's God entitle them, a decent respect for the opinions of mankind requires that they should
declare the causes which impel them to the separation."
It then proceeds to say: "We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men are created equal;
that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among them is life,
liberty, and pursuit of happiness; that to secure these rights governments are instituted, deriving
their just powers from the consent of the governed."
The general words above quoted would seem to embrace the whole human family, and if they
were used in a similar instrument at this day, would be so understood. But it is too clear for
dispute, that the enslaved African race, were not intended to be included, and formed no part of
the people who framed and adopted this Declaration; for if the language as understood in that
day, would embrace them, the conduct of the distinguished men who framed the Declaration of
Independence would have been utterly and flagrantly inconsistent with the principles they
asserted; and instead of the sympathy of mankind, to which they so confidently appealed, they
would have deserved and received universal rebuke and reprobation.
Yet the men who framed this Declaration were great men -- high in literary acquirements -- high
in their sense of honor, and incapable of asserting principles inconsistent with those on which they
were acting. They perfectly understood the meaning of the language they used, and how it would
be understood by others; and they knew that it would not, in any part of the civilized world, be
supposed to embrace the negro race, which, by common consent, had been excluded from
civilized governments and the family of nations, and doomed to slavery. They spoke and acted
according to the then established doctrines and principles, and in the ordinary language of the day,
and no one misunderstood them. The unhappy black race were separated from the white by
indelible marks, and laws long before established, and were never thought of or spoken of except
as property, and when the claims of the owner or the profit of the trader were supposed to need
protection...
No one, we presume, supposes that any change in public opinion or feeling in relation to this
unfortunate race, in the civilized nations of Europe or in this country, should induce the court to
give to the words of the Constitution a more liberal construction in their favor than they were
intended to bear when the instrument was framed and adopted. Such an argument would be
altogether inadmissible in any tribunal called on to interpret it. If any of its provisions are deemed
unjust, there is a mode prescribed in the instrument itself by which it may be amended; but while it
remains unaltered, it must be construed now as it was understood at the time of its adoption. It is
only the same in words, but the same in meaning, and delegates the same powers to the
government, and reserves and secures the same rights and privileges to the citizen; and as long as
it continue to exist in its present form, it speaks not only in the same words, but with the same
meaning and intent with which it spoke when it came from the hands of its framers, and was voted
on and adopted by the people of the United States. Any other rule of construction would abrogate
the judicial character of this court, and make it the mere reflex of the popular opinion or passion
of the day. This court was not created by the Constitution for such purposes. Higher and graver
trusts have been confided to it, and it must not falter in the path of duty.
What the construction was at that time, we think can hardly admit of doubt. We have the
language of the Declaration of Independence and of the Articles of Confederation, in addition to
the plain words of the Constitution itself; we have the legislation of the different States, before,
about the time, and since the Constitution was adopted; we have the legislation of Congress, from
the time of its adoption to a recent period; and we have the constant and uniform action of the
Executive Department, all concurring together, and leading to the same result. And if anything in
relation to the construction of the Constitution can be regarded as settled, it is that which we now
give to the word "citizen" and the word "people."
And upon a full and careful consideration of the subject, the court is of opinion that, upon the
facts stated in the plea in abatement, Dred Scott was not a citizen of Missouri within the meaning
of the Constitution of the United States, and not entitled as such to sue in its courts; and,
consequently, that the Circuit Court had no jurisdiction of the case, and that the judgment on the
plea in abatement is erroneous...
In considering this part of the controversy, two questions arise:
1st. Was he, together with his family, free in Missouri by reason of the stay in the territory of the
United States hereinbefore mentioned? and
2d. If they were not, is Scott himself free by reason of his removal to Rock Island, in the State of
Illinois, as stated in the above admissions?
We proceed to examine the first question.
The Act of Congress, upon which the plaintiff relies, declares that slavery and involuntary
servitude, except as a punishment for crime, shall be forever prohibited in all that part of that
territory ceded by France, under the name of Louisiana, which lies north of thirty-six degrees
thirty minutes north latitude, and not included within the limits of Missouri. And the difficulty
which meets us at the threshold of this part of the inquiry is, whether Congress was authorized to
pass this law under any of the powers granted to it by the Constitution; for if the authority is not
given by that instrument, it is the duty of this court to declare it void and inoperative, and
incapable of conferring freedom upon one who is held as a slave under the laws of any one of the
States.
The counsel for the plaintiff has laid much stress upon that article in the Constitution which
confers on Congress the power "to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations
respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States"; but, in the judgment of
the court, that provision has no bearing on the present controversy, and the power there given,
whatever it may be, is confined, and was intended to be confined, to the territory which at that
time belonged to, or was claimed by, the United States, and was within their boundaries as settled
by the Treaty with Great Britain, and can have no influence upon a territory afterwards acquired
from a foreign government. It was a special provision for a known and particular Territory, and to
meet a present emergency, and nothing more...
Now, as we have before said, all of the States, except North Carolina and Georgia, had made the
cession before the Constitution was adopted, according to the resolution of Congress of October
10, 1780. The claims of other States that the unappropriated lands in these two States should be
applied to the common benefit, in like manner, was still insisted on, but refused by the States. And
this member of the clause in question evidently applies to them, and can apply to nothing else. It
was to exclude the conclusion that either party, by adopting the Constitution, would surrender
what they deemed their rights. And when the latter provision relates so obviously to the
unappropriated lands not yet ceded by the States, and the first clause makes provision for those
then actually ceded, it is impossible, by any rule of construction, to make the first provision
general, and extend to all territories, which the Federal Government might in any way afterwards
acquire, when the latter is plainly and unequivocally confined to a particular territory; which was a
part of the same controversy, and involved in the same dispute, and depended upon the same
principles. The union of the two provisions in the same clause shows that they were kindred
subjects, and that the whole clause is local, and relates only to lands, within the limits of the
United States, which had been or then were claimed by a State; and that no other Territory was in
the mind of the framers of the Constitution, or intended to be embraced in it. Upon any other
construction it would be impossible to account for the insertion of the last provision in the place
where it is found, or to comprehend why, or for what object, it was associated with the previous
provision.
This view of the subject is confirmed by the manner in which the present Government of the
United States dealt with the subject as soon as it came into existence. It must be borne in mind
that the same States that formed the Confederation also formed and adopted the new government,
to which so large a portion of their former sovereign powers were surrendered. It must also be
borne in mind that all of these same States which had then ratified the new Constitution were
represented in the Congress which passed the first law for the government of this territory; and
many of the members of that legislative body had been deputies from the States under the
Confederation--had united in adopting the Ordinance of 1787, and assisted in forming the new
government under which they were then acting, and whose powers they were then exercising.
And it is obvious from the law they passed to carry into effect the principles and provisions of the
Ordinance, that they regarded it as the Act of the States done in the exercise of their legitimate
powers at the time. The new government took the territory as it found it, in the condition in which
it was transferred, and did not attempt to undo anything that had been done. And among the
earliest laws passed under the new government, is one reviving the Ordinance of 1787, which had
become inoperative and a nullity upon the adoption of the Constitution. This law introduces no
new form or principles for its government, but recites, in the preamble, that it is passed in order
that this Ordinance may continue to have full effect, and proceeds to make only those rules and
regulations which were needful to adapt it to the new government, into whose hands the power
had fallen. It appears, therefore, that this Congress regarded the purposes to which the land in this
territory was to be applied, and the form of government and principles of jurisprudence which
were to prevail there, while it remained in the territorial state, as already determined on by the
States when they had full power and right to make the decision; and that the new government,
having received it in this condition, ought to carry substantially into effect the plans and principles
which had been previously adopted by the States, and which no doubt the States anticipated when
they surrendered their power to the new government. And if we regard this clause of the
Constitution as pointing to this Territory, with a territorial government already established in it,
which had been ceded to the States for the purposes hereinbefore mentioned -- every word in it is
perfectly appropriate and easily understood, and the provisions it contains are in perfect harmony
with the objects for which it was ceded, and with the condition of its government as a Territory as
the time. We can, then, easily account for the manner in which the first Congress legislated on the
subject--and can also understand why this power over the Territory was associated in the same
clause with the other property of the United States, and subjected to the like power of making
needful rules and regulations. But if the clause is construed in the expanded sense contended for,
so as to embrace any territory acquired from a foreign nation by the present government, and to
give it in such territory a despotic and unlimited power over persons and property, such as the
confederated States might exercise in their common property, it would be difficult to account for
the phraseology used, when compared with other grants of power -- and also for its association
with the other provisions in the same clause.
The Constitution has always been remarkable for the felicity of its arrangement of different
subjects, and the perspicuity and appropriateness of the language it uses. But if this clause is
construed to extend to territory acquired by the present government from a foreign nation,
outside of the limits of any charter from the British Government to a Colony, it would be difficult
to say, why it was deemed necessary to give the government the power to sell any vacant lands
belonging to the sovereignty which might be found within it; and if this was necessary, why the
grant of this power should precede the power to legislate over it and establish a government there;
and still more difficult to say, why it was deemed necessary so specially and particularly to grant
the power to make needful rules and regulations in relation to any personal or movable property it
might acquire there. For the words, "other property," necessarily, by every known rule of
interpretation, must mean property of a different description from territory or land. And the
difficulty would perhaps be insurmountable in endeavoring to account for the last member of the
sentence, which provides that "nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to prejudice
any claims of the United States or any particular State," or to say how any particular State could
have claims in or to a Territory ceded by a foreign government, or to account for associating this
provision with the preceding provisions of the clause, with which it would appear to have no
connection...
We do not mean, however, to question the power of Congress in this respect. The power to
expand the territory of the United States by the admission of new states is plainly given; and in the
construction of this power by all the departments of the government, it has been held to authorize
the acquisition of territory, not fit for admission at the time, but to be admitted as soon as its
population and situation would entitle it to admission. It is acquired to become a state, and not to
be held as a colony and governed by Congress with absolute authority; and as the propriety of
admitting a new State is committed to the sound discretion of Congress, the power to acquire
territory for that purpose, to be held by the United States until it is in a suitable condition to
become a state upon an equal footing with the other States, must rest upon the same discretion. It
is a question for the Political Department of the government, and not the judicial; and whatever
the Political Department of the government shall recognize as within the limits of the United
States, the Judicial Department is also bound to recognize, and to administer in it the laws of the
United States, so far as they apply, and to maintain in the territory the authority and rights of the
government; and also the personal rights and rights of property of individual citizens, as secured
by the Constitution. All we mean to say on this point is, that, as there is no express regulation in
the Constitution defining the power which the general government may exercise over the person
or property of a citizen in a territory thus acquired, the court must necessarily look to the
provisions and principles of the Constitution, and its distribution of powers, for the rules and
principles by which its decision must be governed.
Taking this rule to guide us, it may be safely assumed that citizens of the United States who
migrate to a territory belonging to the people of the United States, cannot be ruled as mere
colonists, dependent upon the will of the general government, and to be governed by any laws it
may think proper to impose. The principle upon which our governments rest, and upon which
alone they continue to exist, is the union of States, sovereign and independent within their own
limits in their internal and domestic concerns, and bound together as one people by a general
government, possessing certain enumerated and restricted powers, delegated to it by the people of
the several States, and exercising supreme authority within the scope of the powers granted to it,
throughout the dominion of the United States. A power, therefore, in the general government to
obtain and hold Colonies and dependent Territories, over which they might legislate without
restriction, would be inconsistent with its own existence in its present forms. Whatever it acquires,
it acquires for the benefit of the people of the several States who created it. It is their trustee
acting for them, and charged with the duty of promoting the interests of the whole people of the
Union in the exercise of the powers specifically granted...
But the power of Congress over the person or property of a citizen can never be a mere
discretionary power under our Constitution and form of government. The powers of the
government and the rights and privileges of the citizen are regulated and plainly defined by the
Constitution itself. And when the territory becomes a part of the United States, the Federal
Government enters into possession in the character impressed upon it by those who created it. It
enters upon it with its powers over the citizen strictly defined, and limited by the Constitution,
from which it derives its own existence, and by virtue of which alone it continues to exist and act
as a government and sovereignty. It has no power of any kind beyond it; and it cannot, when it
enters a territory of the United States, put off its character, and assume discretionary or despotic
powers which the Constitution has denied to it. It cannot create for itself a new character
separated from the citizens of the United States, and the duties it owes them under the provisions
of the Constitution. The territory being a part of the United States, the government and the citizen
both enter it under the authority of the Constitution, with their respective rights defined and
marked out; and the Federal Government can exercise no power over his person or property,
beyond what that instrument confers, nor lawfully deny any right which it has reserved.
A reference to a few of the provisions of the Constitution will illustrate this proposition.
For example, no one, we presume, will contend that Congress can make any law in a territory
respecting the establishment of religion or the free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of
speech or of the press, or the right of the people of the territory peaceably to assemble and to
petition the government for the redress of grievances.
Nor can Congress deny to the people the right to keep and bear arms, not the right to trial by jury,
nor compel anyone to be a witness against himself in a criminal proceeding.
These powers, and others in relation to rights of person, which it is not necessary here to
enumerate, are, in express and positive terms, denied to the general government; and the rights of
private property have been guarded with equal care. Thus the rights of property are united with
the rights of person, and placed on the same ground by the fifth amendment to the Constitution,
which provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty and property, without due process
of law. And an Act of Congress which deprives a citizen of the United States of his liberty or
property, merely because he came himself or brought his property into a particular Territory of
the United States, and who had committed no offense against the laws, could hardly be dignified
with the name of due process of law.
So, too, it will hardly be contended that Congress could by law quarter a soldier in a house in a
territory without the consent of the owner, in time of peace; nor in time of war, but in manner
prescribed by law. Nor could they by law forfeit the property of a citizen in a territory who was
convicted of treason, for a longer period than the life of the person convicted; nor take private
property for public use without just compensation.
The powers over person and property of which we speak are not only not granted to Congress,
but are in express terms denied, and they are forbidden to exercise them. And this prohibition is
not confined to the States, but the words are general, and extend to the whole territory over
which the Constitution gives it power to legislate, including those portions of it remaining under
territorial government, as well as that covered by States. It is total absence of power everywhere
within the dominion of the United States, and places the citizens of a territory, so far as these
rights are concerned, on the same footing with citizens of the States, and guards them as firmly
and plainly against any inroads which the general government might attempt, under the plea of
implied or incidental powers. And if Congress itself cannot do this--if it is beyond the powers
conferred on the Federal Government--it will authorize a territorial government to exercise them.
It could confer no power on any local government, established by its authority, to violate the
provisions of the Constitution.
It seems, however, to be supposed, that there is a difference between property in a slave and other
property, and that different rules may be applied to it in expounding the Constitution of the United
States. And the laws and usages of nations, and the writings of eminent jurists upon the relation of
master and slave and their mutual rights and duties, and the powers which governments may
exercise over it, have been dwelt upon in the argument.
But in considering the question before us, it must be borne in mind that there is no law of nations
standing between the people of the United States and their government and interfering with their
relation to each other. The powers of the government, and the rights of the citizen under it, are
positive and practical regulations plainly written down. The people of the Untied States have
delegated to it certain enumerated powers, and forbidden it to exercise others. It has no power
over the person or property of a citizen but what the citizens of the United States have granted.
And no laws or usages of other nations, or reasoning of statesmen or jurists upon the relations of
master and slave, can enlarge the powers of the government, or take from the citizens the rights
they have reserved. And if the Constitution recognizes the right of property of the master in a
slave, and makes no distinction between that description of property and other property owned by
a citizen, no tribunal, acting under the authority of the United States, whether it be legislative,
executive, or judicial, has a right to draw such a distinction, or deny to it the benefit of the
provisions and guarantees which have been provided for the protection of private property against
the encroachments of the governments.
Now, as we have already said in an earlier part of this opinion, upon a different point, the right of
property in a slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution. The right to traffic in it,
like an ordinary article of merchandise and property, was guaranteed to the citizens of the United
States, in every State that might desire it, for twenty years. And the government in express terms
is pledged to protect it in all future time, if the slave escapes from his owner. This is done in plain
words--too plain to be misunderstood. And no word can be found in the Constitution which gives
Congress a greater power over slave property, or which entitles property of that kind to less
protection than property of any other description. The only power conferred is the power coupled
with the duty of guarding and protecting the owner in his rights.
Upon these considerations, it is the opinion of the court that the Act of Congress which prohibited
a citizen from holding and owning property of this kind in the territory of the United States north
of the line therein mentioned, is not warranted by the Constitution, and is therefore void; and that
neither Dred Scott himself, nor any of his family, were made free by being carried into this
territory; even if they had been carried there by the owner, with the intention of becoming a
permanent resident...
Upon the whole, therefore, it is the judgment of this court, that it appears by the record before us
that the plaintiff in error is not a citizen of Missouri, in the sense in which that word is used in the
Constitution; and that the Circuit Court of the United States, for that reason, had no jurisdiction
in the case, and could give no judgment in it.
Its judgment for the defendant must, consequently, be reversed, and a mandate issued directing
the suit to be dismissed for want of jurisdiction...
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