I have omitted at the proper place, in the course of my observations
yesterday, two or three points, to which I will now advert before I
resume the discussion where I left off. I have stated that the ordinance
and acts of South Carolina were directed, not against the revenue, but
against the system of protection. But it may be asked, if such was her
object, how happens it that she has declared the whole system void -
revenue as well as protection, without discrimination? It is this
question which I propose to answer. Her justification will be found in
the necessity of the case; and if there be any blame it cannot attach to
her. The two are so blended, throughout the whole, as to make the entire
revenue system subordinate to the protective, so as to constitute a
complete system of protection, in which it is impossible to discriminate
the two elements of which it is composed. South Carolina, at least,
could not make the discrimination; and she was reduced to the
alternative of acquiescing in a system which she believed to be
unconstitutional, and which she felt to be oppressive and ruinous, or to
consider the whole as one, equally contaminated through all its parts,
by the unconstitutionality of the protective portion, and, as such, to
be resisted by the act of the State. I maintain that the State has a
right to regard it in the latter character, and that, if a loss of
revenue follow, the fault is not hers, but of this Government, which has
improperly blended together in a manner not to be separated by the
State, two systems wholly dissimilar. If the sincerity of the State be
doubted; if it be supposed that her action is against revenue as well as
protection, let the two be separated - let so much of the duties as are
intended for revenue be put in one bill, and the residue intended for
protection be put in another, and I pledge myself that the ordinance and
the acts of the State will cease as to the former, and be directed
exclusively against the latter.
I also stated, in the course of my remarks yesterday, and I trust
that I have conclusively shown, that the Act of 1816, with the exception
of a single item, to which I have alluded, was in reality a revenue
measure; and that Carolina and the other States, in supporting it, have
not incurred the slightest responsibility in relation to the system of
protection which has since grown up, and which now so deeply distracts
the country. Sir, I am willing, as one of the representatives of
Carolina, and I believe I speak the sentiments of the State, to take
that act as the basis of a permanent adjustment of the tariff, simply
reducing the duties, in an average proportion, on all the items, to the
revenue point. I make that offer now to the advocates of the protective
system; but I must, in candor, inform them that such an adjustment would
distribute the revenue between the protected and unprotected articles
more favorably to the State, and to the South, and less to the
manufacturing interest, than an average uniform ad valorem, and,
accordingly, more so than that now proposed by Carolina through her
convention. After such an offer, no man who values his candor will dare
accuse the State, or those who have represented her here, with
inconsistency in reference to the point under consideration.
I omitted, also, on yesterday, to notice a remark of the Senator
from Virginia, that the only difficulty in adjusting the
tariff grew out of the ordinance and the acts of South Carolina. I must
attribute an assertion, so inconsistent with the facts, to an ignorance
of the occurrences of the last few years in reference to this subject,
occasioned by the absence of the gentleman from the United States, to
which he himself has alluded in his remarks. If the Senator will take
pains to inform himself, he will find that this protective system
advanced with a continued and rapid step, in spite of petitions,
remonstrances, and protests, of not only Carolina, but also of Virginia,
and of all the Southern States, until 1828, when Carolina, for the first
time, changed the character of her resistance, by holding up her
reserved rights as the shield of her defense against further
encroachment. This attitude alone, unaided by a single State, arrested
the further progress of the system, so that the question from that
period to this, on the part of the manufacturers, has been, not how to
acquire more, but to retain that which they have acquired. I will inform
the gentleman that, if this attitude had not been taken on the part of
the State, the question would not now be how duties ought to be
repealed, but a question as to the protected articles, between
prohibition on one side and the duties established by the Act of 1828 on
the other. But a single remark will be sufficient in reply to what I
must consider the invidious remark of the Senator from Virginia. The Act of 1832 which has not
yet gone into operation, and which
was passed but a few months since, was declared by the supporters of the
system to be a permanent adjustment, and the bill proposed by the
Treasury Department, not essentially different from the act itself, was
in like manner declared to be intended by the administration as a
permanent arrangement. What has occurred since, except this ordinance,
and these abused acts of the calumniated State, to produce this mighty
revolution in reference to this odious system? Unless the Senator from
Virginia can assign some other cause, he is bound, upon every principle
of fairness, to retract this unjust aspersion upon the acts of South
Carolina.
The Senator from Delaware, as well as others, has
relied with great emphasis on the fact that we are citizens, of the
United States. I do not object to the expression, nor shall I detract
from the proud and elevated feelings with which it is associated; but I
trust that I may be permitted to raise the inquiry, In what manner are
we citizens of the United States? without weakening the patriotic
feeling with which, I trust, it will ever be uttered. If by citizen of
the United States he means a citizen at large, one whose citizenship
extends to the entire geographical limits of the country, without having
a local citizenship in some State or territory, a sort of citizen of the
world, all I have to say is, that such a citizen would be a perfect
nondescript; that not a single individual of this description can be
found in the entire mass of our population. Notwithstanding all the pomp
and display of eloquence on the occasion, every citizen is a citizen of
some State or Territory, and, as such, under an express provision of the
Constitution, is entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens
in the several States; and it is in this, and in no other sense, that we
are citizens of the United States. The Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr.
Dallas], indeed, relies upon that provision in the Constitution which
gives Congress the power to establish a uniform rule of naturalization;
and the operation of the rule actually established under this authority,
to prove that naturalized citizens are citizens at large, without being
citizens of any of the States. I do not deem it necessary to examine the
law of Congress upon this subject, or to reply to the argument of the
Senator, though I cannot doubt that he has taken an
entirely erroneous view of the subject. It is sufficient that the power
of Congress extends simply to the establishment of a uniform rule by
which foreigners may be naturalized in the several States or
territories, without infringing, in any other respect, in reference to
naturalization, the rights of the States as they existed before the
adoption of the Constitution.
Having supplied the omissions of yesterday, I now resume the
subject at the point where my remarks then terminated. The Senate will
remember that I stated, at their close, that the great question at issue
is, whether ours is a federal or a consolidated system of government; a
system in which the parts, to use the emphatic language of Mr. Palgrave,
are the integers, and the whole the multiple, or in which the whole is
an unit and the parts the fractions. I stated, that on the decision of
this question, I believed, depended not only the liberty and prosperity
of this country, but the place which we are destined to hold in the
intellectual and moral scale of nations. I stated, also, in my remarks
on this point, that there is a striking analogy between this and the
great struggle between Persia and Greece, which was decided by the
battles of Marathon, Platea, and Salamis, and which immortalized the
names of Miltiades and Themistocles. I illustrated this analogy by
showing that centralism or consolidation, with the exception of a few
nations along the eastern borders of the Mediterranean, has been the
pervading principle in the Asiatic governments, while the federal
system, or, what is the same in principle, that system which organizes a
community in reference to its parts, has prevailed in Europe.
Among the few exceptions in the Asiatic nations, the government of
the twelve tribes of Israel, in its early period, is the most striking.
Their government, at first, was a mere confederation without any central
power, till a military chieftain, with the title of king, was placed at
its head, without, however, merging the original organization of the
twelve distinct tribes. This was the commencement of that central action
among that peculiar people which, in three generations, terminated in a
permanent division of their tribes. It is impossible even for a careless
reader to peruse the history of that event, without being forcibly
struck with the analogy in the causes which led to their separation, and
those which now threaten us with a similar calamity. With the
establishment of the central power in the king commenced a system of
taxation, which, under King Solomon, was greatly increased, to defray
the expenses of rearing the temple, of enlarging and embellishing
Jerusalem, the seat of the central government, and the other profuse
expenditures of his magnificent reign. Increased taxation was followed
by its natural consequences - discontent and complaint, which, before
his death, began to excite resistance. On the succession of his son,
Rehoboam, the ten tribes, headed by Jeroboam, demanded a reduction of
the taxes; the temple being finished, and the embellishment of Jerusalem
completed, and the money which had been raised for that purpose being no
longer required, or, in other words, the debt being paid, they demanded
a reduction of the duties - a repeal of the tariff. The demand was taken
under consideration, and after consulting the old men, the counsellors
of 1798, who advised a reduction, he then took the opinion of the
younger politicians, who had since grown up, and knew not the doctrines
of their fathers; he hearkened unto their counsel, and refused to make
the reduction, and the secession of the ten tribes under Jeroboam
followed. The tribes of Judah and Benjamin, which had received the
disbursements, alone remained to the house of David.
But to return to the point immediately under consideration. I know
that it is not only the opinion of a large majority of our country, but
it may be said to be the opinion of the age, that the very beau ideal of
a perfect government is the government of a majority, acting through a
representative body, without check or limitation on its power; yet, if
we may test this theory by experience and reason, we shall find that, so
far from being perfect, the necessary tendency of all governments, based
upon the will of an absolute majority, without constitutional check or
limitation of power, is to faction, corruption, anarchy, and despotism;
and this, whether the will of the majority be expressed directly through
an assembly of the people themselves, or by their representatives. I
know that, in venturing this assertion, I utter what is unpopular both
within and without these walls; but where truth and liberty are
concerned, such considerations should not be regarded. I will place the
decision of this point on the fact that no government of the kind, among
the many attempts which have been made, has ever endured for a single
generation, but, on the contrary, has invariably experienced the fate
which I have assigned to it. Let a single instance be pointed out, and I
will surrender my opinion. But, if we had not the aid of experience to
direct our judgment, reason itself be a certain guide. The view which
considers the community as an unit, and all its parts as having a
similar interest, is radically erroneous. However small the community
may be, and however homogeneous its interests, the moment that
government is put into operation - as soon as it begins to collect taxes
and to make appropriations, the different portions of the community
must, of necessity, bear different and opposing relations in reference
to the action of the government. There must inevitably spring up two
interests - a direction and a stockholder interest - an interest
profiting by the action of the government, and interested in increasing
its powers and action; and another, at whose expense the political
machine is kept in motion. I know how difficult it is to communicate
distinct ideas on such a subject, through the medium of general
propositions, without particular illustration; and in order that I may
be distinctly understood, though at the hazard of being tedious, I will
illustrate the important principle which I have ventured to advance, by
examples.
Let us, then, suppose a small community of five persons, separated
from the rest of the world; and, to make the example strong, let us
suppose them all to be engaged in the same pursuit, and to be of equal
wealth. Let us further suppose that they determine to govern the
community by the will of a majority; and, to make the case as strong as
possible, let us suppose that the majority, in order to meet the
expenses of the government, lay an equal tax, say of one hundred
dollars, on each individual of this little community. Their treasury
would contain five hundred dollars. Three are a majority; and they, by
supposition, have contributed three hundred as their portion, and the
other two (the minority), two hundred. The three have the right to make
the appropriations as they may think proper. The question is, how would
the principle of the absolute and unchecked majority operate, under
these circumstances, in this little community? If the three be governed
by a sense of justice - if they should appropriate the money to the
objects for which it was raised, the common and equal benefit of the
five, then the object of the association would be fairly and honestly
effected, and each would have a common interest in the government. But,
should the majority pursue an opposite course - should they appropriate
the money in a manner to benefit their own particular interest, without
regard to the interest of the two (and that they will so act, unless
there be some efficient check, he who best knows human nature will least
doubt), who does not see that the three and the two would have directly
opposite interests in reference to the action of the government? The
three who contribute to the common treasury but three hundred dollars,
could, in fact, by appropriating the five hundred to their own use,
convert the action of the government into the means of making money,
and, of consequence, would have a direct interest in increasing the
taxes. They put in three hundred and take out five; that is, they take
back to themselves all that they put in, and, in addition, that which
was put in by their associates; or, in other words, taking taxation and
appropriation together, they have gained, and their associates have
lost, two hundred dollars by the fiscal action of the government.
Opposite interests, in reference to the action of the government, are
thus created between them: the one having an interest in favor of, and
the other against the taxes; the one to increase, and the other to
decrease the taxes; the one to retain the taxes when the money is no
longer wanted, and the other to repeal them when the objects for which
they were levied have been secured.
Let us now suppose this community of five to be raised to
twenty-four individuals, to be governed, in like manner, by the will of
a majority: it is obvious that the same principle would divide them into
two interests - into a majority and a minority, thirteen against eleven,
or in some other proportion; and that all the consequences which I have
shown to be applicable to the small community of five would be
applicable to the greater, the cause not depending upon the number, but
resulting necessarily from the action of the government itself. Let us
now suppose that, instead of governing themselves directly in an
assembly of the whole, without the intervention of agents, they should
adopt the representative principle; and that, instead of being governed
by a majority of themselves, they should be governed by a majority of
their representatives. It is obvious that the operation of the system
would not be affected by the change, the representatives being
responsible to those who chose them, would conform to the will of their
constituents, and would act as they would do were they present and
acting for themselves; and the same conflict of interest, which we have
shown would exist in one case, would equally exist in the other. In
either case, the inevitable result would be a system of hostile
legislation on the part of the majority, or the stronger interest,
against the minority, or the weaker interest; the object of which, on
the part of the former, would be to exact as much as possible from the
latter, which would necessarily be resisted by all the means in their
power. Warfare, by legislation, would thus be commenced between the
parties, with the same object, and not less hostile than that which is
carried on between distinct and rival nations - the only distinction
would be in the instruments and the mode. Enactments, in the one case,
would supply what could only be effected by arms in the other; and the
inevitable operation would be to engender the most hostile feelings
between the parties, which would merge every feeling of patriotism -
that feeling which embraces the whole - and substitute in its place the
most violent party attachment; and instead of having one common centre
of attachment, around which the affections of the community might rally,
there would in fact be two - the interests of the majority, to which
those who constitute that majority would be more attached than they
would be to the whole - and that of the minority, to which they, in like
manner, would also be more attached than to the interests of the whole.
Faction would thus take the place of patriotism; and, with the loss of
patriotism, corruption must necessarily follow, and in its train,
anarchy, and, finally, despotism, or the establishment of absolute power
in a single individual, as a means of arresting the conflict of hostile
interests; on the principle that it is better to submit to the will of a
single individual, who, by being made lord and master of the whole
community, would have an equal interest in the protection of all the
parts.
Let us next suppose that, in order to avert the calamitous train
of consequences, this little community should adopt a written
constitution, with limitations restricting the will of the majority, in
order to protect the minority against the oppression which I have shown
would necessarily result without such restrictions. It is obvious that
the case would not be in the slightest degree varied, if the majority be
left in possession of the right of judging exclusively of the extent of
its powers, without any right on the part of the minority to enforce the
restrictions imposed by the constitution on the will of the majority.
The point is almost too clear for illustration. Nothing can be more
certain than that, when a constitution grants power, and imposes
limitations on the exercise of that power, whatever interests may obtain
possession of the government, will be in favor of extending the power at
the expense of the limitation; and that, unless those in whose behalf
the limitations were imposed have, in some form or mode, the right of
enforcing them, the power will ultimately supersede the limitation, and
the government must operate precisely in the same manner as if the will
of the majority governed without constitution or limitation of power.
I have thus presented all possible modes in which a government
founded upon the will of an absolute majority will be modified; and have
demonstrated that, in all its forms, whether in a majority of the
people, as in a mere democracy, or in a majority of their
representatives, without a constitution or with a constitution, to be
interpreted as the will of the majority, the result will be the same:
two hostile interests will inevitably be created by the action of the
government, to be followed by hostile legislation, and that by faction,
corruption, anarchy, and despotism.
The great and solemn question here presents itself: Is there any
remedy for these evils? on the decision of which depends the question,
whether the people can govern themselves, which has been so often asked
with so much skepticism and doubt. There is a remedy, and but one, the
effect of which, whatever may be the form, is to organize society in
reference to this conflict of interests, which springs out of the action
of government; and which can only be done by giving to each part the
right of self-protection; which in a word, instead of considering the
community of twenty-four a single community, having a common interest,
and to be governed by the single will of an entire majority, shall upon
all questions tending to bring the parts into conflict, the thirteen
against the eleven, take the will, not of the twenty-four as a unit, but
of the thirteen and of the eleven separately - the majority of each
governing the parts, and where they concur, governing the whole - and
where they disagree, arresting resting the action of the government.
This I will call the concurring, as distinct from the absolute majority.
In either way the number would be the same, whether taken as the
absolute or as the concurring majority. Thus, the majority of the
thirteen is seven, and of the eleven six; and the two together make
thirteen, which is the majority of twenty-four. But, though the number
is the same, the mode of counting is essentially different: the one
representing the strongest interest, and the other, the entire interests
of the community. The first mistake is, in supposing that the government
of the absolute majority is the government of the people - that beau
ideal of a perfect government which has been so enthusiastically
entertained in every age by the generous and patriotic, where
civilization and liberty have made the smallest progress. There can be
no greater error: the government of the people is the government of the
whole community - of the twenty-four - the self-government of all the
parts - too perfect to be reduced to practice in the present, or any
past stage of human society. The government of the absolute majority,
instead of being the government of the people, is but the government of
the strongest interests, and, when not efficiently checked, is the most
tyrannical and oppressive that can. be devised. Between this ideal
perfection on the one side, and despotism on the other, no other system
can be devised but that which considers society in reference to its
parts, as differently affected by the action of the government, and
which takes the sense of each part separately, and thereby the sense of
the whole, in the manner already illustrated.
These principles, as I have already stated, are not affected by
the number of which the community may be composed, but are just as
applicable to one of thirteen millions - the number which composes ours
- as of the small community of twenty-four, which I have supposed for
the purpose of illustration; and are not less applicable to the
twenty-four States united in one community, than to the case of the
twenty-four individuals. There is, indeed, a distinction between a large
and a small community, not affecting the principle, but the violence of
the action. In the smaller, the similarity of the interests of all the
parts will limit the oppression from the hostile action of the parts, in
a great degree, to the fiscal action of the government merely; but in
the large community, spreading over a country of great extent, and
having a great diversity of interests, with different kinds of labor,
capital, and production, the conflict and oppression will extend, not
only to a monopoly of the appropriations on the part of the stronger
interests, but will end in unequal taxes, and a general conflict between
the entire interests of conflicting sections, which, if not arrested by
the most powerful checks, will terminate in the most oppressive tyranny
that can be conceived, or in the destruction of the community itself.
If we turn our attention from these supposed cases, and direct it
to our Government and its actual operation, we shall find a practical
confirmation of the truth of what has been stated, not only of the
oppressive operation of the system of an absolute majority, but also a
striking and beautiful illustration in the formation of our system, of
the principle of the concurring majority, as distinct from the absolute,
which I have asserted to be the only means of efficiently checking the
abuse of power, and, of course, the only solid foundation of
constitutional liberty. That our Government for many years has been
gradually verging to consolidation; that the Constitution has gradually
become a dead letter; and that all restrictions upon the power of
government have been virtually removed, so as practically to convert the
General Government into a Government of an absolute majority without
check or limitation, cannot be denied by any one who has impartially
observed its operation.
It is not necessary to trace the commencement and gradual progress
of the causes which have produced this change in our system; it is
sufficient to state that the change has taken place within the last few
years. What has been the result? Precisely that which might have been
anticipated: the growth of faction, corruption, anarchy, and, if not
despotism itself, its near approach, as witnessed in the provisions of
this bill. And from what have these consequences sprung? We have been
involved in no war. We have been at peace with all the world. We have
been visited with no national calamity. Our people have been advancing
in general intelligence, and, I will add, as great and alarming as has
been the advance of political corruption among the mercenary corps who
look to government for support, the morals and virtue of the community
at large have been advancing in improvement. What, I again repeat, is
the cause? No other can be assigned but a departure from the fundamental
principles of the Constitution, which has converted the Government into
the will of an absolute and irresponsible majority, and which, by the
laws that must inevitably govern in all such majorities, has placed in
conflict the great interests of the country, by a system of hostile
legislation, by an oppressive and unequal imposition of taxes, by
unequal and profuse appropriations, and by rendering the entire labor
and capital of the weaker interest subordinate to the stronger.
This is the cause, and these the fruits which have converted the
Government into a mere instrument of taking money from one portion of
the community to be given to another; and which has rallied around it a
great, a powerful and mercenary corps of office-holders, office-seekers,
and expectants, destitute of principle and patriotism, and who have no
standard of morals or politics but the will of the Executive - the will
of him who has the distribution of the loaves and the fishes. I hold it
impossible for any one to look at the theoretical illustration of the
principle of the absolute majority in the cases which I have supposed,
and not be struck with the practical illustration in the actual
operation of our Government. Under every circumstance the absolute
majority will ever have its American system (I mean nothing offensive to
any Senator); but the real meaning of the American system is, that
system of plunder which the strongest interest has ever waged, and will
ever wage, against the weaker, where the latter is not armed with some
efficient and constitutional check to arrest its action. Nothing but
such a check on the part of the weaker interest can arrest it; mere
constitutional limitations are wholly insufficient. Whatever interest
obtains possession of the Government, will, from the nature of things,
be in favor of the powers, and against the limitations imposed by the
Constitution, and will resort to every device that can be imagined to
remove those restraints. On the contrary, the opposite interest, that
which I hear designated as the stockholding interests, the taxpayers,
those on whom the system operates, will resist the abuse of powers, and
contend for the limitations. And it is on this point, then, that the
contest between the delegated and the reserved powers will be waged; but
in this contest, as the interests in possession of the Government are
organized and armed by all its powers and patronage, the opposite
interest, if not in like manner organized and possessed of a power to
protect themselves under the provisions of the Constitution, will be as
inevitably crushed as would be a band of unorganized militia when
opposed by a veteran and trained corps of regulars. Let it never be
forgotten that power can only be opposed by power, organization by
organization; and on this theory stands our beautiful federal system of
Government. No free system was ever further removed from the principle
that the absolute majority, without check or limitation, ought to
govern. To understand what our Government is, we must look to the
Constitution, which is the basis of the system. I do not intend to enter
into any minute examination of the origin and the source of its powers:
it is sufficient for my purpose to state, as I do fearlessly, that it
derived its power from the people of the separate States, each ratifying
by itself, each binding itself by its own separate majority, through its
separate convention - the concurrence of the majorities of the several
States forming the Constitution; - thus taking the sense of the whole by
that of the several parts, representing the various interests of the
entire community. It was this concurring and perfect majority which
formed the Constitution, and not that majority which would consider the
American people as a single community, and which, instead of
representing fairly and fully the interests of the whole, would but
represent, as has been stated, the interests of the stronger section. No
candid man can dispute that I have given a correct description of the
constitution-making power: that power which created and organized the
Government, which delegated to it, as a common agent, certain powers, in
trust for the common good of all the States, and which imposed strict
limitations and checks against abuses and usurpations. In administering
the delegated powers, the Constitution provides, very properly, in order
to give promptitude and efficiency, that the Government shall be
organized upon the principle of the absolute majority, or rather, of two
absolute majorities combined: a majority of the States considered as
bodies politic, which prevails in this body; and a majority of the
people of the States, estimated in federal numbers, in the other House
of Congress. A combination of the two prevails in the choice of the
President, and, of course, in the appointment of Judges, they being
nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. It is thus that
the concurring and the absolute majorities are combined in one complex
system: the one in forming the Constitution, and the other in making and
executing the laws; thus beautifully blending the moderation, justice,
and equity of the former, and more perfect majority, with the promptness
and energy of the latter, but less perfect.
To maintain the ascendancy of the Constitution over the law making
majority is the great and essential point on which the success of the
system must depend. Unless that ascendancy can be preserved, the
necessary consequence must be that the laws will supersede the
Constitution; and, finally, the will of the Executive, by the influence
of his patronage, will supersede the laws - indications of which are
already perceptible. This ascendancy can only be preserved through the
action of the States as organized bodies having their own separate
governments, and possessed of the right, under the structure of our
system, of judging of the extent of their separate powers, and of
interposing their authority to arrest the unauthorized enactments of the
General Government within their respective limits. I will not enter, at
this time, into the discussion of this important point, as it has been
ably and fully presented by the Senator from Kentucky, and
others who preceded him in this debate, on the same side, whose
arguments not only remain unanswered, but are unanswerable. It is only
by this power of interposition that the reserved rights of the States
can be peacefully and efficiently protected against the encroachments of
the General Government - that the limitations imposed upon its authority
can be enforced, and its movements confined to the orbit allotted to it
by the Constitution.
It has, indeed, been said in debate that this can be effected by
the organization of the General Government itself, particularly by the
action of this body, which represents the States - and that the States
themselves must look to the General Government for the preservation of
many of the most important of their reserved rights. I do not underrate
the value to be attached to the organic arrangement of the General
Government and the wise distribution of its powers between the several
departments, and, in particular, the structure and the important
functions of this body; but to suppose that the Senate, or any
department of this Government, was intended to be the only guardian of
the reserved rights is a great and fundamental mistake. The Government,
through all its departments, represents the delegated and not the
reserved powers; and it is a violation of the fundamental principle of
free institutions to suppose that any but the responsible representative
of any interest can be its guardian. The distribution of the powers of
the General Government and its organization were arranged to prevent the
abuse of power in fulfilling the important trusts confided to it, and
not, as preposterously supposed, to protect the reserved powers, which
are confided wholly to the guardianship of the several States.
Against the view of our system which I have presented, and the
right of the States to interpose, it is objected that it would lead to
anarchy and dissolution. I consider the objection as without the
slightest foundation; and that, so far from tending to weakness or
disunion, it is the source of the highest power and of the strongest
cement. Nor is its tendency in this respect difficult of explanation.
The government of an absolute majority, unchecked by efficient
constitutional restraints, though apparently strong is, in reality, an
exceedingly feeble government. That tendency to conflict between the
parts, which I have shown to be inevitable in such governments, wastes
the powers of the State in the hostile action of contending factions,
which leaves very little more power than the excess of the strength of
the majority over the minority. But a government based upon the
principle of the concurring majority, where each great interest
possesses within itself the means of self-protection, which ultimately
requires the mutual consent of all the parts, necessarily causes that
unanimity in council and ardent attachment of all the parts to the whole
which give an irresistible energy to a government so constituted. I
might appeal to history for the truth of these remarks, of which the
Roman furnishes the most familiar and striking proofs. It is a
well-known fact that, from the expulsion of the Tarquins to the time of
the establishment of the tribunitian power, the government fell into a
state of the greatest disorder and distraction, and, I may add,
corruption. How did this happen? The explanation will throw important
light on the subject under consideration. The community was divided into
two parts - the Patricians and the Plebeians; with the power of the
State principally in the hands of the former, without adequate checks to
protect the rights of the latter. The result was as might be expected.
The patricians converted the powers of the government into the means of
making money to enrich themselves and their dependents. They, in a word,
had their American system, growing out of the peculiar character of the
government and condition of the country. This requires explanation. At
that period, according to the laws of nations, when one nation conquered
another, the lands of the vanquished belonged to the victor; and,
according to the Roman law, the lands thus acquired were divided into
two parts - one allotted to the poorer class of the people, and the
other assigned to the use of the treasury - of which the patricians had
the distribution and administration. The patricians abused their power
by withholding from the plebeians that which ought to have been allotted
to them, and by converting to their own use that which ought to have
gone to the treasury. In a word, they took to themselves the entire
spoils of victory, and had thus the most powerful motive to keep the
State perpetually involved in war, to the utter impoverishment and
oppression of the plebeians. After resisting the abuse of power by all
peaceable means, and the oppression becoming intolerable, the plebeians
at last withdrew from the city - they, in a word, seceded; and to induce
them to reunite, the patricians conceded to them, as the means of
protecting their separate interests, the very power which I contend is
necessary to protect the rights of the States, but which is now
represented as necessarily leading to disunion. They granted to them the
right of choosing three tribunes from among themselves, whose persons
should be sacred, and who should have the right of interposing their
veto, not only against the passage of laws, but even against their
execution - a power which those who take a shallow insight into human
nature would pronounce inconsistent with the strength and unity of the
State, if not utterly impracticable; yet so far from this being the
effect, from that day the genius of Rome became ascendant, and victory
followed lowed her steps till she had established an almost universal
dominion. How can a result so contrary to all anticipation be explained?
The explanation appears to me to be simple. No measure or movement could
be adopted without the concurring assent of both the patricians and
plebeians, and each thus become dependent on the other; and, of
consequence, the desire and objects of neither could be effected without
the concurrence of the other. To obtain this concurrence, each was
compelled to consult the good-will of the other, and to elevate to
office, not those only who might have the confidence of the order to
which they belonged, but also that of the other. The result was, that
men possessing those qualities which would naturally command confidence
- moderation, wisdom, justice, and patriotism - were elevated to office;
and the weight of their authority and the prudence of their counsel,
combined with that spirit of unanimity necessarily resulting from the
concurring assent of the two orders, furnish the real explanation of the
power of the Roman State, and of that extraordinary wisdom, moderation,
and firmness which in so remarkable a degree characterized her public
men. I might illustrate the truth of the position which I have laid down
by a reference to the history of all free States, ancient and modern,
distinguished for their power and patriotism, and conclusively show, not
only that there was not one which had not some contrivance, under some
form, by which the concurring assent of the different portions of the
community was made necessary in the action of government, but also that
the virtue, patriotism, and strength of the State were in direct
proportion to the perfection of the means of securing such assent.
In estimating the operation of this principle in our system, which
depends, as I have stated, on the right of interposition on the part of
a State, we must not omit to take into consideration the amending power,
by which new powers may be granted, or any derangement of the system
corrected, by the concurring assent of three-fourths of the States; and
thus, in the same degree, strengthening the power of repairing any
derangement occasioned by the eccentric action of a State. In fact, the
power of interposition, fairly understood, may be considered in the
light of an appeal against the usurpations of the General Government,
the joint agent of all the States, to the States themselves, to be
decided under the amending power, by the voice of three-fourths of the
States, as the highest power known under the system. I know the
difficulty, in our country, of establishing the truth of the principle
for which I contend, though resting upon the clearest reason, and tested
by the universal experience of free nations. I know that the governments
of the several States, which, for the most part, are constructed on the
principle of the absolute majority, will be cited as an argument against
the conclusion to which I have arrived; but, in my opinion, the
satisfactory answer can be given - that the objects of expenditure which
fall within the sphere of a State government are few and inconsiderable,
so that, be their action ever so irregular, it can occasion but little
derangement. If, instead of being members of this great confederacy,
they formed distinct communities, and were compelled to raise armies,
and incur other expenses necessary to their defense, the laws which I
have laid down as necessarily controlling the action of a State where
the will of an absolute and unchecked majority prevailed, would speedily
disclose themselves in faction, anarchy, and corruption. Even as the
case is, the operation of the causes to which I have referred is
perceptible in some of the larger and more populous members of the
Union, whose governments have a powerful central action, and which
already show a strong moneyed tendency, the invariable forerunner of
corruption and convulsion.
But, to return to the General Government. We have now sufficient
experience to ascertain that the tendency to conflict in its action is
between the southern and other sections. The latter having a decided
majority, must habitually be possessed of the powers of the Government,
both in this and in the other House; and, being governed by that
instinctive love of power so natural to the human breast, they must
become the advocates of the power of government, and in the same degree
opposed to the limitations; while the other and weaker section is as
necessarily thrown on the side of the limitations. One section is the
natural guardian of the delegated powers, and the other of the reserved;
and the struggle on the side of the former will be to enlarge the
powers, while that on the opposite side will be to restrain them within
their constitutional limits. The contest will, in fact, be a contest
between power and liberty, and such I consider the present - a contest
in which the weaker section, with its peculiar labor, productions, and
institutions, has at stake all that can be dear to freemen. Should we be
able to maintain in their full vigor our reserved rights, liberty and
prosperity will be our portion; but if we yield, and permit the stronger
interest to concentrate within itself all the powers of the Government,
then will our fate be more wretched than that of the aborigines whom we
have expelled. In this great struggle between the delegated and reserved
powers, so far from repining that my lot, and that of those whom I
represent, is cast on the side of the latter, I rejoice that such is the
fact; for, though we participate in but few of the advantages of the
Government, we are compensated, and more than compensated, in not being
so much exposed to its corruptions. Nor do I repine that the duty, so
difficult to be discharged, of defending the reserved powers against
apparently such fearful odds, has been assigned to us. To discharge it
successfully requires the highest qualities, moral and intellectual; and
should we perform it with a zeal and ability proportioned to its
magnitude, instead of mere planters, our section will become
distinguished for its patriots and statesmen. But, on the other hand, if
we prove unworthy of the trust - if we yield to the steady encroachments
of power, the severest calamity and most debasing corruption will
overspread the land. Every southern man, true to the interests of his
section, and faithful to the duties which Providence has allotted him,
will be forever excluded from the honors and emoluments of this
Government, which will be reserved for those only who have qualified
themselves, by political prostitution, for admission into the Magdalen
Aslyum.
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